Skill Formation and Labor Mobilization in the Global South
My first line of research has explored the politically contested terrain of skill formation, unpacking key dynamics behind the transformation of worker skills in the automobile industry using original data collected over fifteen months of fieldwork in Bursa (Turkey), Istanbul (Turkey) and Córdoba (Argentina). As part of this study, I showed that partisan preferences of politicians, businessmen and union leaders are the key to understanding variation in resulting training arrangements. Very importantly, political institutions that surround these exchanges influence the extent to which industrial upgrading programs are contested by workers.
Islamic Finance in non-Western Settings
My second project shifts the focus from manufacturing to finance in the non-Western world and examines the development of the Islamic financial industry in a comparative perspective. In some countries (especially Malaysia and the UAE), the growth rate of Islamic financial transactions is breathtakingly fast. Previously considered as a niche area, Islamic finance made it to the global headlines--especially after its impressive performance during the 2008 economic crisis. Some identify Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) as exceptional cases with stronger asset quality, higher liquidity, and a rapidly growing consumer base, and argue that religious governance mechanisms--which rely on shared faith-based codes such as mutual risk-sharing, the ban on interest and elimination of contractual ambiguity--explain why these institutions continue to exhibit a solid outlook. Meanwhile, regulatory frameworks that govern IFIs vary widely, especially with respect to the type of contracts they authorize across different jurisdictions. This research is interested in unpacking these distinct institutional configurations through the lens of financial product innovation and development strategies across Malaysia, the UAE, and Turkey.
Financialization and Authoritarian Survival
A more recent project seeks to reveal how the financial policy toolbox of the autocrats contributes to the resilience of illiberal regimes. The focus is on financial market building and market regulation–including banking reforms–to explore how these tactics strengthened authoritarian regimes and prolonged their tenure. Existing studies predominantly focus on the ruler’s fiscal toolkit while non-fiscal policies get very little attention. Yet, we know very little about the ruler’s market-building policies in an era of economic globalization. While some argue that market liberalization is not the preferred choice of authoritarian regimes, most of these governments implemented reforms—notably on the financial end—to align national regulations with those in advanced industrialized settings. Thus, the project is motivated by two key questions: Why do non-democratic governments implement financial liberalization reforms despite the associated political risks? Do these reforms create new opportunities to eliminate political opposition and secure authoritarian survival?
My second project shifts the focus from manufacturing to finance in the non-Western world and examines the development of the Islamic financial industry in a comparative perspective. In some countries (especially Malaysia and the UAE), the growth rate of Islamic financial transactions is breathtakingly fast. Previously considered as a niche area, Islamic finance made it to the global headlines--especially after its impressive performance during the 2008 economic crisis. Some identify Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) as exceptional cases with stronger asset quality, higher liquidity, and a rapidly growing consumer base, and argue that religious governance mechanisms--which rely on shared faith-based codes such as mutual risk-sharing, the ban on interest and elimination of contractual ambiguity--explain why these institutions continue to exhibit a solid outlook. Meanwhile, regulatory frameworks that govern IFIs vary widely, especially with respect to the type of contracts they authorize across different jurisdictions. This research is interested in unpacking these distinct institutional configurations through the lens of financial product innovation and development strategies across Malaysia, the UAE, and Turkey.
Financialization and Authoritarian Survival
A more recent project seeks to reveal how the financial policy toolbox of the autocrats contributes to the resilience of illiberal regimes. The focus is on financial market building and market regulation–including banking reforms–to explore how these tactics strengthened authoritarian regimes and prolonged their tenure. Existing studies predominantly focus on the ruler’s fiscal toolkit while non-fiscal policies get very little attention. Yet, we know very little about the ruler’s market-building policies in an era of economic globalization. While some argue that market liberalization is not the preferred choice of authoritarian regimes, most of these governments implemented reforms—notably on the financial end—to align national regulations with those in advanced industrialized settings. Thus, the project is motivated by two key questions: Why do non-democratic governments implement financial liberalization reforms despite the associated political risks? Do these reforms create new opportunities to eliminate political opposition and secure authoritarian survival?